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Jersey encountered no particular difficulty in holding that the tavern-
keeper's negligence could be the proximate cause of the accident and
that a jury could find that Nichols' acts did not constitute a super-
seding cause.
Perhaps the most important underlying consideration in the Rap-
paport decision is public policy. The court said:
"Liquor licensees, who operate their business by way of
privilege rather than as of right, have long been under strict
obligation not to serve minors and intoxicated persons and if,
as is likely, the result we have reached... substantially increases
their diligence in honoring that obligation then the public in-
terest will indeed be very well served."2 9
The New Jersey courts have made similar statements in liquor
license revocation suits, which admittedly differ in context from the
one in question.30 While these statements may be attacked as dicta,
they do indicate the strict policy generally adopted toward the vendor
of intoxicating beverages.
Although the decision in Rappaport is contrary to the weight of
authority and is subject to the criticism of being judicial legislation,3'
it can be explained on the basis of New Jersey's judicial approach to
the establishment of negligence, its definition of proximate and super-
seding cause, and its policy of carefully regulating the vendors of in-
toxicating liquors.
WILLIAM W. MOORE
MILITARY JURISDICTION TO TRY CIVILIANS
DURING PEACETIME
As a result of four recent Supreme Court decisions, Congress no
longer has the constitutional right to subject civilians accompany-
ing the armed forces abroad to military court-martial during peace
time.' Military jurisdiction over civilians existed during the Revolu-
" 15 6 A.2d 1, o (1959).
"°Essex Holding Corp. v. Hock, 136 N.J.L. 28, 54 A.2d 209 (Sup. Ct. 1947). In
re Larsen, 17 N.J. Super. 564, 86 A.2d 430 (App. Div. 195a).
3A similar holding in Schcelin v. Goldberg, supra note it, has been subjected
to this same criticism.
2Civilians are subject to military jurisdiction during wartime. Perlstein v.
United States, 151 F.2d 167 (3 d Cir. 1945); Hines v. Mikell, 259 Fed. 28 (4 th Cir.
1919); In re Di Bartolo, 5o F. Supp. 929 (S.D.N.Y. 1943); Ex parte Gerlack, 247 Fed.
616 (S.D.N.Y. 1917).
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tion,2 and was first incorporated in the United States Code of 192o.
It was redelegated to the armed forces in the 195o Uniform Code of
Military Justice, article 2(11),4 and by means of treaties and other
agreements under which foreign lands agreed to waive jurisdiction
over these civilians, the military was able to continue its jurisdiction
as the area of operation of our armed forces expanded.5
The power of Congress to provide that the military could try
accompanying civilians supposedly stemmed from article I, section 8,
clause 14 of the Constitution,6 which provides that Congress shall have
the power to make rules for our land and naval forces. This seemingly
all-inclusive power of Congress to promulgate regulations was first
limited in 1955 by the decision in United States ex rel. Toth v.
Quarles when it was held unconstitutional to court-martial a dis-
charged veteran for a crime committed during active service. Although
a section of the Uniform Code other than article 2(1 1) was in dispute,s
the Toth case indicated that the Supreme Court did not favorably re-
gard military jurisdiction over American citizens in foreign lands.
The limitation imposed upon military jurisdiction in Toth was
distinguished in the first hearing of Reid v. Covert9 (hereinafter re-
"The American Revolutionary Army initially was governed by 'Articles of War'
adopted by the Continental Congress on June 3o, 1775. Nine of the original 69 Ar-
ticles provided for the trial by court-martial of persons serving with the army but
who were not soldiers .... In 1778, a relevant addition was made. It provided, in
pertinent part: 'That every person employed either as Commissary, Quarter Master,
forage Master, or any other Civil Department of the Army shall be subject to trial
by Court Martial ....... Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234,
266-67 (1960) (dissenting opinion).
'Act of June 4, 192o, ch. 227, ch. II, § 1 Art. 2(d), 41 Stat. 787 (1920).
4"The following persons are subject to this chapter:
Subject to any treaty or agreement to which the United States is or may be a
party or to any accepted rule of international law, persons serving with, employed
by, or accompanying the armed forces outside the United States and outside the fol-
lowing [territories] .. 0.." 10 U.S.C. § 8o2 Art. 2 (11) (1958).
157 Stat. 1193 (Great Britain); Administrative Agreement, Feb. 28, 1952, [1952 ]
3 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 3341, T.I.A.S. No. 2492 (Japan).
"The Congress shall have Power ... To make Rules for the Government and
Regulation of the land and naval Forces; ... To make all Laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers...." U.S.
Const. art. I, § 8.
'35o U.S. 11 (1955).
850 U.S.C. 553 (1951), now codified in io U.S.C. § 803 (1958). This section deals
with the right of the military to return discharged service men to stand court-
martial for crimes allegedly committed by them during active service.
'351 U.S. 487 (1956). Mr. Justice Black said in Covert II that the holding in this
case was based upon In re Ross, 140 US. 453, 464 (1891), where the Court stated,
"The Constitution can have no operation in another country." The Court also
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ferred to as Covert 1), when the Supreme Court sustained the con-
stitutionality of military jurisdiction over civilian dependents accused
of committing capital crimes while abroad. The basis for the decision
was that constitutional guarantees, such as jury trial and grand jury
indictment, do not extend abroad so as to cover the Covert fact situ-
ation. Covert I sustained the constitutionality of article 2(11) of the
UCMJ, but within the year the case was reversed on rehearing.10 This
second case (hereinafter referred to as Covert II) held that civilian
dependents accused of committing capital crimes abroad could not be
subjected to military court-martial, thereby rendering article 2(11)
unconstitutional in this situation." Thus, Covert II established that
the Necessary and Proper Clause will not expand military jurisdiction
to cover these dependents during peace time, because there is a right
under the Constitution to trial by jury in established constitutional
courts.
1 2
Military jurisdiction over civilians was limited by this decision,
but the status of dependents accused of noncapital crimes and em-
ployees accused of any crime while abroad.was not settled until Jan-
uary 18, 196o, when four decisions dealing with these persons were
handed down by the Supreme Court. These cases were Kinsella v.
United States ex rel. Singleton,13 which held that a dependent abroad
could not be court-martialed even though the crime was non-capital;
Grisham v. Hagan,14 which held that employees accused of commit-
ting capital crimes were not subject to military jurisdiction; and Mc-
Elroy v. United States ex rel. Guagliardo'5 and Wilson v. Bohlender,16
relied upon the Insular cases which decided that Congress had the right to make
laws for the government of territories, without restrictions imposed upon that body
when passing laws for the United States. E.g., Balzac v. People of Porto [sic] Rico,
258 U.S. 298 (1922); Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (i9o4); Hawaii v. Man-
kichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903).
"354 U.S. 1 (1957).
"Id. at 19-4o. For a detailed discussion of this case, see 15 Wash. & Lee L. Rev.
79 (1958). See also 7 Duke LJ. 155 (1958); 9 Hastings L.J. 85 (1957); 17 Md. L. Rev.
335 (1957)-
"Courts established under Article III of the United States Constitution are
called constitutional courts. They share in the exercise of the judicial power which
is defined in that section with no power in Congress to provide otherwise, but
those courts created by Congress under Article I are called legislative courts. The
functions of these courts are directed to the execution of one or more of such powers
and are prescribed by Congress independently of Article Il1. Ex parte Bakelite
Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 449 (1929).
23361 U.S. 234 (1960).
"'361 U.S. 278 (1960).
1361 U.S. 281 (sg6o).
"Ibid.
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which held that employees accused of non-capital offenses were not
under article 2(11) of the Uniform Code.
In Singleton a District Court of West Virginia granted habeas
corpus to a dependent convicted of a noncapital offense on the ground
that article 2(11) was unconstitutional, and therefore the military court
had no basis of jurisdiction over the petitioner.17 The court, referring
to the decision in Covert I, stated that it could "think of no logical
distinction, insofar as the constitutional power of Congress is con-
cerned, between its asserted power, denied by the Supreme Court, to
subject dependents of members of the armed forces overseas to the
jurisdiction of courts-martial for capital offenses, and the like ques-
tioned power in cases of non-capital offenses."' 8 This decision removed
all dependents abroad from military jurisdiction. The government ap-
pealed this adverse decision to the Supreme Court but the lower
court's decision was affirmed in a seven to two decision. The govern-
ment argued that military jurisdiction over dependents committing
noncapital crimes was a necessary and proper incident of the congres-
sional power to make rules and regulations for the armed services, and
should be continued since our government had entered into various
international agreements and treaties providing for military jurisdic-
tion over American citizens accompanying the armed forces in foreign
countries.' 9
The court rejected these arguments and based its decision upon
Toth and Covert II. In quoting from Toth, Mr. Justice Clark, writing
for the majority, stated that military tribunals must be restricted "to
the narrowest jurisdiction deemed absolutely essential to maintaining
discipline among the troops in active service." 20 The majority, relying
heavily on Covert H1, felt that the test was "military status" 21 rather
than the offense committed, and that this had been the basis of mili-
tary jurisdiction throughout history. The Court stated that this theory
was reinforced by the "unambiguous language of Article I, section 8,
clause 14 .... 2 22 The Necessary and Proper Clause does not create
power to circumvent the constitutional safeguards of civilians, 23 even
though they live abroad. If the Necessary and Proper Clause does not
expand clause 14 to include prosecutions of civilian dependents for
"United States ex rel. Singleton v. Kinsella, 164 F. Supp. 707 (S.D. W. Va. 1958).
"Id. at 709.
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capital 'crimes, then it likewise does not expand clause 14 to include
military prosecutions of dependents for noncapital offenses.
2 4
Having abolished all military jurisdiction over dependents, 25 the
Supreme Court turned its attention to the question of the constitu-
tionality of military jurisdiction over employees accused of committing
capital and noncapital offenses while abroad. In Grisham v. Hagan,20
an army employee convicted of a capital crime by a military court pe-
titioned for a writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner had been convicted
prior to the decision in Covert II, and it was on the basis of this de-
cision that he sought his release. The District Court denied the writ,2 7
and this denial was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit.28 In affirming, Judge Goodrich relied upon Covert II, and
stated that Grisham "was in the position of the person described by
Mr. Justice Black .... He had not been formally inducted, he did not
wear a uniform, but he was as closely connected with the Army as
though he had.
'29
Some writers had predicted this result, 0 but, contrary to their pre-
diction, the Supreme Court reversed, and held that a writ of habeas
corpus should be granted to Grisham, since article 2(11) was unconsti-
tutional even as to an employee convicted of a capital offense. Mr.
Justice Clark, again writing for the majority, stated that the decision
in Covert II was controlling, for "the death penalty is so irreversible
that a dependent charged with a capital crime must have the benefit
of a jury. The awesomeness of the death penalty has no less impact
when applied to civilian employees." 3' Thus, the Court of Appeals' dis-
tinction based on Mr. Justice Black's dictum was not followed. Justices
Harlan and Frankfurter concurred, and in so doing re-emphasized the
"id. at 248.
'5See 361 U.S. at 249-58. Justices Whittaker and Stewart concurred in the majority
opinion. "Inasmuch as six members of the Court have held in Covert that Congress
may not constitutionally provide for the court-martial trial and punishrhent of
civilian dependents 'accompanying the armed forces' overseas in peacetime in
capital cases, and because I can see no constitutional distinction between Congress'
power to provide for the court-martial punishment of capital offenses, on the
one hand and non-capital offenses, on the other hand, I conclude that the holding
in Covert means that civilian dependents accompanying the armed forces in peace-
time are not subject to military power, and that it requires aflirmance of. .. the
Singleton case." 361 U.S. at 263-64.
"361 U.S. 278 (ig6o).
2Grisham v. Taylor, 161 F. Supp. 112 (M.D. Pa. 1958).
"261 F.2d 204 (1958).
"Id. at 206-07.
3°Note, 47 Geo. L.J. 411, 415 (1958); Note, io7 U. Pa. L. Rev. 270, 275 (1958);
Comment, 15 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 318, 320 (1958).
"361 U.S. at 280.
CASE COMMENTS
point made in Singleton that the test should be the type of crime com-
mitted, and not whether the individual is a dependent or an em-
ployee.
32
On the other hand, Justices Whittaker and Stewart dissented,
feeling this was too strict a limitation to place on military jurisdiction.
Relying upon Mr. Justice Black's dictum in Covert 11, they indicated
that the power to make rules for the land and naval forces included
the power to make rules governing civilian employees accompanying
the armed forces.33
Since Grisham established that military jurisdiction over civilian
employees accused of committing capital offenses while abroad was
unconstitutional, the only remaining military jurisdiction was over
civilian employees accused of committing noncapital offenses while
abroad. In McElroy v. Guagliardo and Wilson v. Bohlender, the Su-
preme Court took the final step and granted habeas corpus to civilian
employees convicted of noncapital crimes by military courts martial.
These decisions were the most difficult for the Court to make, both
being five to four.34
In Guagliardo the Court of Appeals felt itself bound by Covert II,
and held that the Necessary and Proper Clause did not expand the
power of Congress to make rules and regulations for the land and
naval forces so as to cover those not formally inducted into the mili-
tary.35 The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision. In
Wilson the petitioner was not successful in the lower court.3 6 In grant-
'361 U.S. at 249.
Is6i U.S. at 259.
'Justices Harlan and Frankfurter dissented on the ground that the offenses
were noncapital, 361 U.S. at 250. Justices Stewart and Whittaker dissented because
they thought civilian employees should be under military jurisdiction. Id. at 264.
3'The District Court denied the writ of habeas corpus, 158 F. Supp. 171 (D.D.C.
1958); however, this court was reversed by the Court of Appeals which felt that
Covert II was controlling, for article 2(11) of the UCMJ could not be separated into
different classes, i.e., employees and dependents; thus the writ was granted to
Guagliardo. 259 F.2d 927, 933 (1958). The severability basis used by the Court of
Appeals as the grounds upon which to grant the writ was summarily reversed by
the Supreme Court. The Act provided for the severability of the remaining sections
if part of the Act was judged invalid. However, the Court of Appeals was affirmed
in its decision. 361 U.S. at 283.
3United States ex rel. Wilson v. Bohlender, 167 F. Supp. 791 (D. Colo. 1958).
The District Court in denying the writ of habeas corpus, relied upon Mr. Justice
Black's dictum in Covert II where it was stated that one could be in the armed
forces for the purpose of jurisdiction without wearing a uniform. Wilson, an em-
ployee of the Army, fell into this category. 167 F. Supp. at 797. The Supreme Court
granted certiorari to Wilson before argument in the Tenth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals was perfected.
i96o]
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ing habeas corpus, the Supreme Court, Mr. Justice Clark writing the
opinion, admitted that there was some historical support for military
jurisdiction over employees, but stated that these materials were
"too episodic, too meager, to form a solid basis in history... for con-
stitutional adjudication."3  Justices Stewart and Whittaker dissented
in both Guagliardo and Wilson. They agreed that dependents should
not be under military jurisdiction,3 8 but asserted that employees
serving abroad were an integral part of the armed forces and should
be under military control.3 9
It is now clear that our military forces no longer have court-
martial jurisdiction over dependents or employees abroad during
peacetime. Although constitutional protection has theoretically been
expanded to include these persons, this protection has in reality been
limited. Prior to these decisions the American military authorities had
obtained the right to exercise primary jurisdiction over these civilians
in certain instances through agreements or treaties with the host
countries.4 0 However, since United States military authorities can no
longer constitutionally exercise this jurisdiction, jurisdiction reverts
to the host country to try the offender.41 This is true both under the
Status of Forces Agreement and under principles of international law.
1361 U.S. at 284.
'*Id. at 264.
"1"There is a marked and clear difference between civilian dependents ... and
civilian persons 'serving with [or] employed by' the armed forces ... These civilian
employees thus perform essential services for the military and, in doing so, are sub-
ject to the orders ... of the same military commands as the 'members' of those
forces .... They [employees] have the same contact with ... the military operations
as members of those forces and present the same security risks and disciplinary prob-
lems .... They are so intertwined with those forces ... as to be ... an integral part
of them. On the other hand, civilian dependents . . . perform no services for the
forces, present dissimilar security and disciplinary problems . . .[and] have only
a few of the military privileges ... ." 561 U.S. at 264-65.
"The best known of these agreements is the NATO Status of Forces Agreement,
July 24, 1953 [1953] 2 U.S.T. & 0. I. A. 1792, T.I.A.S. 2846 (effective Aug. 23, 1953).41The NATO Status of Forces Agreement, ibid., provides follows: United States
military authorities have exclusive jurisdiction over persons subject to military law
for offenses punishable by United States law but not local law.
Local authorities (the foreign country) have exclusive jurisdiction over all
persons for offenses punishable by local law but not United States law.
All other offenses ars subject to the concurrent jurisdiction of both parties sub-
ject to the following:
United States military authorities have primary jurisdiction over of-
fenses solely against the property or security of the United States or against
the person or property of other United States personnel and offenses arising
out of any act or ommission done in the performance of official duty.
In all other cases the local authorities have the primary right to ex-
ercise jurisdiction.
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Since the American military authorities can no longer court-martial
these civilians, should they be turned over to the foreign country for
trial?4 2 If so, it seems quite ironic. The Supreme Court's denial of
court-martial jurisdiction was based upon the absence in court martial
procedure of certain protections guaranteed by the United States
Constitution; namely, indictment by grand jury and trial by jury.
However, these protections are absent from the legal systems of most
of the host countries.43 In support of the proposition that we turn
over our civilian dependents and employees to the foreign country
for trial, it may be noted that other non-immune government em-
ployees abroad are under foreign court jurisdiction and few incidents
have been reported which show any fundamental unfairness in the
trial procedures given to the American citizen. If the foreign country
is allowed to try American civilian offenders, not only may diplomatic
relations be improved, but the United States may well avoid the re-
sentment and grave concern caused by the Girard case.44
If Congress prefers, however, to have our civilians abroad tried
in the United States courts, can this result be accomplished in light
of these decisions? Some writers advocate returning civilians to the
United States for trial. From a practical standpoint, this solution
seems quite undesirable. The judge Advocate of the Navy has stated:
"The disruption of duties within a command and the expense in-
volved in shipping even nationals of the United States as witnesses
to this country would place a burden on the Navy which would re-
sult in only unusually serious cases being tried."45 Foreign witnesses
cannot be compelled to go to the United States and their depositions
cannot be used.46 Also, no district court presently has jurisdiction
'2The right to try the American civilian would revert to the local authorities
by the terms of the above agreement; however, the discretion as to whether the
offender will be prosecuted by the foreign country remains with the military au-
thorities. According to the Judge Advocate General of the United States Navy,
the present Navy policy is to make a case by case determination whether to turn
over civilian offenders to the host country for trial in those cases where the United
States has primary jurisdiction under the existing agreement. In addition, many
of the lesser offenses are now handled administratively by the Navy. Letter from
the Judge Advocate General of the Navy, March 24 , 1 96o.
'American Bar Association, 1959 Proceedings, Section of International and
Comparative Law, 123.
"Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524 (1957). Harrison, Court-Martial Jurisdiction of
Civilians-A glimpse at Some Constitutional Issues, 7 Military Law Review 61,
83 n.18o (Department of the Army Pamphlet No. 27-100-7, January 196o).
'Letter from Judge Advocate General of the Navy, March 24, 196o.
'Fed. R. Grim. P. 15.
i96o]
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over ordinary offenses committed abroad; and therefore, additional
legislation would be required to authorize this procedure.
47
Another suggested method of providing for our civilians accompany-
ing the armed forces abroad to be tried by Article III courts, is the use
of a roving district court which would function like the early English
tribunals. Since our forces are stationed in over forty different coun-
tries, this solution is not without its difficulties, but it is possible that
many of these countries would cede primary jurisdiction to the United
States civil courts in those situations in which the American military
courts formerly had jurisdiction.
The final solution to the problem of where our civilan offenders
abroad will be tried rests with Congress and with the President. In
the interest of certainty some action should soon be taken, for these
decisions leave too many unsettled problems for our military authori-
ties, as well as for the host countries.
KENNETH 0. HUNTINGDON, JR.
'TCivilian courts in the United States do not have jurisdiction over ordinary
offenses committed abroad. United States v. Bowman, 26o U.S. 94, 98 (1922). A
statute could authorize the return for trial of civilians. See 18 U.S.C. § 3238 (1958).
